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 Chapter 7 
 Descartes on the Theory of Life 
and Methodology in the Life Sciences 
 Karen  Detlefsen 
 Abstract  As a practicing life scientist, Descartes must have a theory of what it 
means to be a living being. In this paper, I provide an account of what his theoretical 
conception of living bodies must be. I then show that this conception might well run 
afoul of his rejection of fi nal causal explanations in natural philosophy. Nonetheless, 
I show how Descartes might have made use of such explanations as merely hypo-
thetical, even though he explicitly blocks this move. I conclude by suggesting that 
there is no reason for him to have blocked the use of hypothetical fi nal causes in 
this way. 
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 Descartes was a practicing natural philosopher. His areas of research included a 
specifi c interest in investigating the phenomena of life. He treated human, animal, 
and plant bodies as distinctive kinds of bodies, and he afforded them separate scien-
tifi c 1 treatment, both in practice and in his written work. On 18 December 1629, he 
wrote to Mersenne that he was beginning a study of  anatomy (AT I, 102) 2 , by which 
he meant the anatomy of living bodies. The fruits of his anatomical and physiologi-
cal investigations appeared in various written forms throughout his life, including 
 Traité de l’homme (hereafter  Treatise ), the fi fth part of  Discours de la méthode 
( Discourse ), a planned but unwritten fi fth section of the  Principia Philosophiae 
(AT VIIIa, 315/CSM I, 279;  Principles ), the fi rst 16 articles of Part I of  Passions de 
l’âme (and various comments scattered throughout the remainder of that text; 
 Passions ),  La Description du corps humain ( Description ) which also deals with 
1  I use the term “science” and its cognates for ease of expression, mindful of the fact that our mean-
ing of the term most closely aligns with  Descartes ’ “natural philosophy”. 
2  I use the following abbreviations to refer to editions and translations of Descartes’ works: 
AT=Descartes 1964–76; CSM=Descartes 1985a; CSMK=Descartes 1985b; SV=Descartes 1989; 
SG=Descartes 1998. 
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animal and plant bodies,  Primae cogitationes circa generationem animalium 
( Generation ),  Excerpta anatomica ( Excepts ), and assorted letters. 
 Given this, we can expect that  Descartes conceives of living beings as distinct 
from non-living beings in some way or another. For if this were not true, then 
Descartes would have no way of isolating a class of bodies taken to be  living bodies, 
and he would then not be able to identify any individuals to serve as the subject mat-
ter of the life sciences – sciences to which he devoted considerable professional 
time. And this would render incoherent this aspect of his life as a working natural 
philosopher. Moreover, he explicitly does acknowledge life as a category. In a letter 
to Regius of June 1642, for example Descartes talks of many sorts of bodies as 
machines, but he nonetheless makes distinctions within the broader class of 
machines, 3 and isolates those that are  living from the rest (AT III, 566/CSMK 214). 
He also acknowledges the category of life in other texts. For example, he planned 
(though never wrote) a fi fth section of the  Principles devoted to “living things, i.e. 
animals and plants” (AT VIIIa, 315/CSM I, 279), and one can effectively argue that 
Descartes includes the human body among those that are living given his recogni-
tion that human bodies and animals perform many of the same sorts of actions (AT 
III, 121/CSMK 149), including those detailed in his writings on animals. He also 
makes a clear distinction between the machines we can build and living machines 
when he emphasizes that we could never make ourselves a new body because we 
could never make the matter out of which our bodies are constructed (AT VI, 148). 
 But there are two diffi culties  Descartes faces in identifying a separate class of 
living beings, and both stem from the fact that, for him, metaphysics is ontologically 
prior to both physics and what we might call the “special sciences”. 4 Recall his 
famous “tree of philosophy” with metaphysics as the roots, giving rise to and plac-
ing constraints on physics as the truck, which in turn gives rise to and places con-
straints on the special sciences, “which may be reduced to three principal ones, 
namely medicine, mechanics, and morals” (AT IXb, 14/CSM I, 186). There are two 
aspects of Descartes’ metaphysics that cause him potential diffi culties in identifying 
a class of living beings to serve as the subject matter of the life sciences. The fi rst is 
his austere ontology of the created world, according to which there are just two 
kinds of substances, material substance (with the essence of extension) and souls 
(unextended things with the essence of thought). The second is his conception of 
God’s nature and our relationship with him, specifi cally that fact that we do not have 
cognitive access to God’s ends, or the purposes that guided him in the creation of the 
material world. 
3  On the meaning of “machine”, specifi cally with respect to  Descartes ’  medical philosophy , see 
Manning  2012 . 
4  See Hatfi eld  1993 and Garber  1992 , 13 for this account of the relation between metaphysics and 
physics. A different way of thinking about the relation between metaphysics and physics is put 
forth by Stephen Gaukroger who holds that “there was nothing internal to  Descartes ’ project of 
natural philosophy that required metaphysical foundations, and there was nothing crucial to his 
natural philosophy that could only be generated from such metaphysical foundations” (Gaukroger 
 2002 , 1–4). I leave aside these two competing visions of the relation between metaphysics and 
physics, since this debate does not impact my current project. 
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 The fi rst aspect of  Descartes ’ metaphysics noted above leads to the fi rst hurdle in 
identifying a class of living being – the easier hurdle to overcome. Because he 
rejects the notion of natural essences beyond material substance as extension and 
immaterial thinking souls, he loses the ability to ground universals or natural material 
kinds in the ontology of the world. With every material body having the same 
essence as every other material body, there appears to be nothing in the nature of 
bodies themselves that identifi es them as distinct kinds of bodies worthy of distinct 
scientifi c treatment. Indeed, according to this line of argument, there are exactly two 
natural kinds in the world – embodied souls, for souls  cannot non-miraculously exist 
without human bodies (AT III, 461/CSMK 200) – and all non-ensouled material 
bodies. So there can be a science of human beings grounded in a distinct ontology, 
but no other special science grounded in a distinct ontology. 5 Descartes’ ontology 
thus permits special, scientifi c treatment of only the human being, but not of the 
living body. But this is a problem for Descartes given that he includes animal and 
plant bodies with human bodies in his anatomical and physiological writings. In the 
fi rst section of this paper, I develop what I think should have been Descartes’ theo-
retical conception of life. In doing so, I show that Descartes does not eliminate the 
class of living bodies from his natural philosophy even while his austere ontology 
of material substance does result in the ability to explain the phenomena of all living 
bodies in terms of matter in lawful inertial motion; that is he is a  reductionist with 
respect to explanation of life phenomena but not an  eliminativist with respect to life 
itself 6 – much as we are today, albeit with a more sophisticated science at our disposal. 
 Providing a solution to the fi rst problem just noted feeds directly into the second 
problem. For the theoretical account of living beings that I think  Descartes must 
be – and implicitly is – committed to relies upon making claims to God’s ends or 
purposes  vis a viz the created material world. But this fl ies in the face of the second 
aspect of his metaphysics noted above, specifi cally that we cannot know any of 
God’s ends with respect to his creation of the material world, and so we cannot rely 
upon knowledge claims regarding those ends in natural philosophy. 7 I think this 
problem is surmountable given resources Descartes has within his natural philoso-
phy, and I show (in Parts 2–4 of this essay) how Descartes could have overcome this 
diffi culty had he called upon these resources. I am particularly interested in  showing: 
(a) that there is a way of attributing weak sorts of internal 8 ends to material bodies 
5  Stephen Menn ( 2000 , 139–41) and Dennis Des Chene ( 2001 , 30, 62 and 64) both suggest that this 
may well follow from  Descartes ’ ontology. 
6  On this point, see Gaukroger  2000 and  2010 . T.S. Hall ( 1970 , 55–56) also points to the fact that 
 Descartes provides reductionist explanations, and while Hall does not explicitly mention that 
Descartes does not thereby eliminate the category of life altogether, it is strongly implicit in his 
discussion of Descartes’ account of living bodies. 
7  For a few of the many articles on  Descartes ’ ideas on fi nal cause in natural philosophy, see Brown 
 2013 ; De Rosa  2007 ; Detlefsen  2013 ; Distelzweig  2015 ; Hatfi eld  2008 ; La Porte  1928 ; Schmaltz 
( manuscript ); and Simmons  2001 . 
8  I avoid the use of “intrinsic” and “extrinsic”, using “internal” and “external” instead to avoid the 
technical meaning of the former pair in  Descartes ’ philosophy. See Manning  2012 and Manning 
 forthcoming . I engage with Manning’s discuss of intrinsic and extrinsic denominations in Sect.  7.3 
below when I expand on what I mean by “internal ends” in Descartes. 
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considered  not in terms of their metaphysical essence but rather in terms of their 
built structures; and (b) that Descartes’ own friendliness to  hypotheses in natural 
philosophy could have allowed him to appeal to such internal ends (even though he 
explicitly blocks this move). 
 In the process of completing this work, I aim to underscore  Descartes ’ role in 
two historical trends that are especially interesting in the history of the life sciences. 
First (only implicit in Descartes), once Aristotelian substantial forms are ousted 
from an account of living bodies by mechanists such as Descartes, there appears to 
be no easy way to ground ends within the nature of wholly material bodies. And yet, 
pre-theoretically, and in accordance with common  sense , built machines must have 
some sort of end internal to them; Aristotle implicitly acknowledges this, even with 
respect to artifacts, and it is implicit in Descartes’ writings too. The crucial differ-
ence is that Aristotelianism has the ontology to account easily for this while it is less 
clear how this  teleology can be accommodated on a Cartesian ontology. Second, in 
scientifi c epistemology, there is the emergence of a respectable category of the 
probable according to which the probable is not automatically associated with the 
merely speculative. This category is associated with the use and testing of  hypoth-
eses , and Descartes himself embraced the use of hypotheses, and thus embraced 
(however uneasily) the category within scientifi c epistemology of the respectably 
probable. He just didn’t capitalize on his embrace of this trend as fully as he might 
have in his life sciences. 
 Before starting the main work of this paper, I make the following two prelimi-
nary points. First, there are two distinct theories of the  origins of living bodies to be 
found in  Descartes ’ corpus. One is the idea that living forms emerged from an initial 
chaos through non-purposeful motion of that material chaos (e.g. VI: 42/CSM I, 
132; XI: 34-5/ CSM I, 91; and VIIIa: 102-3/ CSM I, 257). 9 The other is the idea that 
God formed those beings. In this paper, I proceed on the assumption of the latter 
idea, even while I think there is much promise in Descartes’ chaos idea. Dealing 
with the chaos theory is work for elsewhere. 
 The second preliminary point is that I propose we think about  Descartes ’ general 
approach to the life sciences in the follow way. Dennis Des Chenes’ insight 
expressed thus is helpful:
 No doubt some sort of distinction between living and nonliving things comes to us early in 
life. In every human culture the classifi cation of things into living and nonliving is among 
the most basic. Though some judgments have changed, Aristotle’s division between living 
and nonliving, those of Aristotelian authors,  Descartes ’, and our own, overlap a great deal. 
But broad agreement on the domain of life coexists easily… with grossly dissimilar con-
cepts of life. The list of things that Hobbes, Descartes, and Regius would call plants and 
animals differs little from the lists that Toletus, Suárez, or Eustachius would give. The 
concept of the living in the new philosophers, on the other hand, differs as greatly from the 
Aristotelians’ as do their concepts of body and natural change. 10 
9  For a discussion of some of the material I cover herein with the chaos theory in mind, see Hatfi eld 
 2008 . 
10  Des Chene  2000a , 20. 
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 Descartes ’ own way of proceeding as a natural philosopher seems to follow the 
general approach captured by Des Chene. First, Descartes pre-theoretically identi-
fi es the domain of the living. Second, he then subjects the individuals within this 
domain to scientifi c investigation. The investigations may well problematize pre- 
theoretical intuitions about what does and does not fall into the domain of the liv-
ing – as it does for working scientists today. But the fi rst two steps do seem to 
capture Descartes’ actual approach as a working life scientist. Further, it is clear 
what Descartes takes to be the items that serve as the subject matter of the life sci-
ences: plants, animals, and human bodies considered (counterfactually) in isolation 
of their souls. 11 These are the bodies that he implicitly identifi es as living when he 
studies these and only these in his active scientifi c practice and in his theoretical 
biological 12 writings. He also explicitly identifi es animals and plants as living, and 
he does so within the context of his treatment of human bodies indicating that the 
latter are living too. In the  Description , for example, he is explicit that human bod-
ies, animals, and plants should be categorized together  as living when, for example, 
he extends his discussion of nutrition beyond the human: “…we must bear in mind 
that the parts of those  living bodies that are maintained through nourishment, that is, 
animals and plants, undergo continual change…” (XI: 247/ CSM I, 319; emphasis 
added). The domain of life, then, includes all and only plant, animal and human 
bodies. My task now is to reconstruct a theoretical account of life that is consistently 
capable of picking out all and only members of this domain, and that is consistent 
with Descartes’ texts and own conceptual commitments, including the metaphysics 
that is at the foundations. 
7.1  Descartes ’ Conceptions of Life 
 Ann Wilbur MacKenzie is right when she proposes that “ Descartes did not provide 
any systematic and general analysis of ‘x is alive’”, 13 because he did not abstract 
suffi ciently enough from his specifi c claims about individual living beings to derive 
a general theory. Still, as she and others have shown, it is possible to infer a number 
of different possible conceptions of life, which Descartes may have embraced. In 
this section, I draw upon the insights of MacKenzie and others who bring some ele-
ments of Descartes’ conception of life to our attention. 14 I consider three possible 
11  Given my focus on the human  body , along with other non-ensouled living bodies, my project 
departs somewhat from a project that focuses exclusively on  medical philosophy to the extent that 
the latter is a fi eld concerned with the health and illness of human beings. 
12  As with my use of “science”, I use the term “biology” mindful of the fact that this term and the 
cluster of sciences we now recognize by this term did not emerge until the late eighteenth century. 
I use this for ease of expression to capture  Descartes ’ writings about living bodies. 
13  MacKenzie  1975 , 2–3. 
14  Ablondi  1998 ; Bitbol-Hespériès  1990 ; Canguihelm  1965 ; Distelzweig  2015 ; Des Chene  2000b ; 
and Shapiro  2003 . 
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theories of life for which there is textual evidence in Descartes’ corpus. I show that 
all three capture crucial elements of the theoretical account of living bodies to which 
I believe Descartes must have been committed. 
7.1.1  Living Bodies as Those with Heat as Their Corporeal 
Principle of Action 15 
 In a letter to Henry More of 5 February 1649  Descartes writes: “I do not deny life to 
animals, since I regard it as consisting simply in the heat of the heart…” (AT V, 278/
CSMK 366; c.f. AT IV, 686; AT XI, 226/CSM I, 316; AT XI: 333/SV 23; AT XI 
407/SV 76–7). Since this is the most explicit statement regarding the principle of 
life to be found in Descartes, it is tempting to simply take Descartes at his word and 
accept this as the defi ning criterion of life. 
 But this criterion will not serve the purpose for it cannot unfailingly pick out all 
and only living bodies. Some of the apparent diffi culties with this criterion are sur-
mountable with a large dose of charity in interpretation, but not all the diffi culties 
can be overcome. First, while  Descartes locates this heat in the heart of the living 
organism, it is not clear that all living organisms have hearts; plants are the clearest 
case. 16 Still, one may salvage the heat criterion by acknowledging that Descartes 
also allows for heat generally conceived (and not located in any specifi c organ), to 
act as the principle of life since he also says that it is the principle common to ani-
mals, plants, and human bodies (letter to Mersenne: AT III, 122/CSMK 149), even 
before any organs, including the heart, have begun to form at all (AT XI, 534). But, 
and second, one may object to the claim that all organisms are in fact hot, and again 
plants are an obvious example as are cold-blooded animals. Descartes explicitly 
faces this objection. In response to Plempius’ claim that fi sh do not have hot hearts 
(AT I, 498), Descartes responds that “although we do not feel much heat in fi sh, 
their hearts feel hotter than all other organs in their body” (AT I, 529/CSMK 83; c.f. 
AT II, 66/CSMK 94–5). Likewise, he takes the heat found in animal hearts to be 
analogous to the heat in hay before it dries (AT XI, 121/SG 100 and 254/CSM I, 
322; AT VI, 46/CSM I, 134), and charitably read, this can be taken as a case of 
plants so newly cut as to retain some vestige of life (namely, heat). More explicitly, 
Descartes claims that tree bark and fruit (presumably both examples of plant life) 
can exude vapors due to their internal heat (AT II, 67/CSMK 95–6). Whatever the 
empirical validity of these observations, it is clear that Descartes wishes to extend 
heat to all human, animal, and plant bodies seemingly in order designate them all as 
living machines. 
 The heat criterion, however, is not an adequate principle of life because it allows 
too many individuals into that category. Fred Ablondi draws our attention to this 
15  Bitbol-Hespériès  1990 ,  passim takes heat as  Descartes ’ theory of life. 
16  This is MacKenzie’s ( 1975 , 3–5) objection to the conception of life as heat in the heart. Ablondi 
( 1998 , 181) makes this objection too. 
K. Detlefsen
147
diffi culty, noting the problematic case of the steam engine. 17 Similarly damaging are 
 Descartes ’ own examples, such as when he likens the heat found in living bodies to 
that which occurs during the  fermentation of wine (AT XI, 254/CSM I. 322), indi-
cating that this heat is also found in the nonliving. Heat from a fi re without light, 
then, is consequently not up to the task of identifying all  and especially only mem-
bers of the class of living machines since it is also found in some non-living bodies 
and processes as well. 
 One may wish to take this as evidence that there is, in the fi nal analysis, no 
clearly delineated category of living bodies for  Descartes given his explicit associa-
tion of heat with life. 18 I resist this conclusion, for we must pay heed to Descartes’ 
own words and practice, acknowledge that he is committed to a science of life, and 
therefore acknowledge the need for the category of life. Consequently, we must 
dismiss the “heat without light” candidate as a viable one for Descartes’ theory of 
life. 
7.1.2  Living Bodies as God-Made Machines with a Complexity 
Specifi c to Them 
 Less explicit than the heat criterion is the suggestion that living bodies are machines 
made by God and thus have a kind of complexity that distinguishes them from non- 
living machines. Here are two texts suggesting this conception:
 Those who know how many kinds of automata, or moving machines, the skill of man can 
construct with the use of very few parts, in comparison with the great multitude of bones, 
muscles, nerves, arteries, veins and all the other parts that are in the body of any animal.... 
will regard this [animal] body as a machine which, having been made by the hands of God, 
is incomparably better ordered than any machine that can be devised by man, and contains 
in itself movements more wonderful than those in any machine made by man (AT VI, 55-6/
CSM I, 139). 
 And:
 We see clocks, artifi cial fountains, mills, and other similar machines, which, even though 
they are only made by men, have the power to move of their own accord in various ways. 
And, as I am supposing that this machine [made with the explicit intention of being as much 
like us as possible] is made by God, I think you will agree that it is capable of a greater 
variety of movements than I could possibly imagine in it, and that it exhibits a greater inge-
nuity than I could possibly ascribe to it. 
 I shall not pause to describe to you the bones, nerves, muscles, veins, arteries, stomach, 
liver, spleen, heart, brain, not all the other different parts from which this machine must be 
composed, for I am assuming that they are just like those parts of our own bodies having the 
same names…. [S]o that it remains only for me to explain these movements [that depend 
upon the parts] to you here in the proper order and by these means to tell you which of our 
functions these represent. (AT XI, 120-1/CSM I, 99) 
17  Ablondi  1998 , 183. 
18  See Bitbol-Hespériès  1990 , 71. 
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 There are a number of ways of interpreting this criterion. Certainly, there seem 
to be two central features of it: living machines are “incomparably better ordered” 
and so exhibit “a greater ingenuity” than is to be found in non-living machines such 
as those made by humans; and living machines are “made by the hands of God”. 
The fi rst feature just noted might be interpreted in one of two ways: living bodies 
might have a  degree of complexity that far surpasses that of non-living bodies; or 
they might have a  kind of complexity far superior to any that a human could achieve 
when building a machine. 
 Locating the source of the uniqueness of living bodies in a difference in degree 
is suggested in the fi rst passage where  Descartes refers to human-made machines as 
having “very few parts” in comparison with God’s machines. This is a promising 
route to take, especially for a theologically minded philosopher of the seventeenth 
century. For one might claim that the difference in kind between living and non- 
living derives from a difference in degree between infi nitely complex living bodies 
(that only an infi nitely capable builder, i.e. God, could make) and merely fi nitely 
complex non-living bodies (that humans may well be capable of making). This will 
be one way through which both Malebranche and Leibniz secure the distinction 
between living and non-living. But it is not Descartes’ way for he is reluctant to 
associate the infi nite with anything other than God himself (e.g. AT VIIIa, 14–15/
CSM I, 201–202). According to Descartes, God’s machines are only “incompara-
bly” better ordered. Perhaps, then, Descartes believes that living bodies are complex 
 enough (but not infi nitely so) to demarcate living bodies. While this accords with 
Descartes’ own position on the infi nite, it fails to secure a conception of life. For 
without the difference in degree being a difference between the fi nite and the infi -
nite, there can be no decisive difference in kind. Somewhere along the continuum of 
increasingly complex machines, a line is supposedly crossed that demarcates the 
living from the non-living, but it is not clear where this line lies such that a princi-
pled distinction can be drawn. 19 Maybe Descartes could shore up this second 
approach by saying that what makes living bodies unique is not  simply that they 
have an incomparable (though not infi nite) degree of complexity, but that they have 
this due to their having been made by God. But this will not suffi ce, for God made 
many other machines besides living bodies, and so we must still be able to distin-
guish between his living and his non-living machines. But then the burden for this 
distinction must fall somewhere, and, once again, an incomparable yet not infi nite 
degree of complexity is not up to the task of doing the work necessary to make the 
distinction. 
 So perhaps  Descartes ’ intention is to locate the source of the uniqueness of living 
bodies in a special  kind of complexity found in God-made living machines that is 
19  Thomas Fuchs makes this point ( 2001 , 125). Genevieve Rodis-Lewis ( 1978 ) approaches this 
point too when considering AT II: 525 which allows that crystals may have a middle nature 
between living and non-living. It may be possible for  Descartes to tolerate these grey areas in the 
same way that we tolerate diffi cult cases that seem to straddle the life-nonlife divide (such as 
viruses), but there is no need for this since there is a better theory of life forthcoming which does 
not require Descartes to accommodate the sort of grey area identifi ed here. 
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not shared by any other machines, God-made or other. This does seem to capture 
better Descartes’ intention as articulated in the texts above. Then the obvious ques-
tion arises: what  is that special kind of complexity in structure that God has made 
that can demarcate the living from the non-living? The texts cited above offer two 
answers. According to one answer, living bodies have a “great multitude” of certain 
 kinds of parts in common (also, probably, disposed to one another in certain ways): 
hearts, arteries, livers and so forth (as Descartes lists in the passages above). The 
second passage cited is dealing with the supposed replica of a  human body that 
Descartes is asking the reader to imagine. As human, the list of very specifi c body 
parts offered as unique to such a body makes  sense . The fi rst passage is more trou-
blesome, however, for that passage is meant to apply to the body of “any animal”, 
and it is not immediately clear that all animals (monkeys, turtles and oysters alike) 
possess the same collection of body parts. Moreover, if we were to take this concep-
tion to be the theoretical conception of life Descartes is committed to, then it would 
have to apply equally to plants as well as to animal and human bodies. But on the 
face of it, plants do not have hearts or livers or spleens or bones. 20 So  prima facie , a 
special kind of complexity that identifi es specifi c body parts as necessary to that 
complexity, is not adequate as a conception of life since it cannot reliably pick out 
all members of the domain of life. 21 
 According to the second answer to the question “what  is that special kind of 
complexity in structure that God has made that can demarcate the living from the 
non-living?”, living bodies have the sort of structure – including the sorts of body 
parts – that can permit “movements more wonderful than those in any machine 
made by man”. This answer certainly makes reference to the structure, but the struc-
ture remains entirely abstract 22 – a living body’s structure is  whatever structure is 
necessary to give rise to specifi c, wonderful movements, and many, diverse struc-
tures might fi t that bill. Additionally, in this answer, the structure is subordinate to 
and in service of the life-specifi c functions or behaviors of the body. And it is these 
functions or behaviors, which do the real conceptual work in distinguishing the 
living from the non-living; the abstract structure is only a means to the defi nitive 
functions. So this second answer is really a third and distinct conception of life: 
living bodies are those that behave or function in specifi c ways. I turn to this third, 
extremely promising, conception shortly. 23 
 So, as with the heat theory, the present theory of life fails to identify all and only 
living bodies in a reliable and principled fashion. Taken as a theory about the  degree of 
complexity of structure, this theory fails for there is no way to establish a difference 
20  There were attempts in the early modern period to fi nd structural equivalents of major organs 
across all living beings, including plants. The fact of these attempts might blunt the current criti-
cism somewhat. See Delaporte, François [1979]  1982 . 
21  See Des Chene  2001 , 54ff for diffi culties in identifying  parts in  Descartes . 
22  This is MacKenzie’s point. She holds that one causal component in  Descartes ’ defi nition of life 
must be this fully abstract structural complexity, which permits the behaviors defi nitive of living 
bodies (MacKenzie  1975 , 9). 
23  See Ablondi  1998 for an enlightening discussion of the structural complexity criterion. 
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in  kind between living and non-living without recourse to an infi nitely complex 
body. And taken as a theory about the  kind of complexity, where reference to spe-
cifi c body parts is essential to that theory, it once again fails because it cannot pick 
out all and only members of the domain of life given the immense diversity in the 
parts of different living bodies. And so this second theory by itself, cannot be 
 Descartes ’ considered theoretical conception of life. 
7.1.3  Living Bodies as Machines that Function in Ways 
Unique to Plants, Animals, and Human Bodies 
 As  Descartes ’ experiments and writings on living bodies suggest, the behaviors or 
activities of life are more or less those that Aristotle associates with the vegetative 
 soul and some of those Aristotle associates with the sensitive soul. The most general 
functions associated with all living bodies (e.g. AT XI, 202/CSM I, 108; AT I, 263/
CSMK 40) are foetal formation (or  generation ), growth (which includes trans-
formation as opposed to mere accretion of matter [XI: 596–87]), nutrition and 
self- maintenance, reproduction, and response to the surrounding environment; in 
animals, this ability to respond to the environment includes the abilities to  sense , 
remember, and learn in so far as these psychological abilities are conceived of solely 
in corporeal terms (e.g. AT VII, 436/CSM II, 294; AT X, 416/CSM I, 43; AT III, 
433-34/CSMK 196; and  Passions passim when Descartes discusses habituation). 
 MacKenzie includes life functions as one among a few that together make up 
 Descartes ’ complex theory of life in her view, which includes both causes and effect. 
“A creature is alive if and only if it has some principle of motion (or other) which, 
together with some arrangement of parts (or other), enables that creature to engage 
in some set of activities (or other) which in turn enable that creature to carry out a 
set of life functions”. 24 The life functions she recognizes are nutrition, growth and 
 generation , and all living bodies display these functions. She also recognizes more 
determinate activities that only specifi c  kinds of living beings exhibit as contribut-
ing to the more general life functions. Examples of these more determinate activi-
ties (e.g. in animals with hearts) might include digestion, the heartbeat, and 
respiration. 25 According to MacKenzie’s approach, then, an adequate account of life 
must make reference to two causes – a principle of motion (such as heat), and a 
 suitable disposition of organic parts – and a complex of effects – specifi c behaviors 
unique to a sub-class of living machines (e.g. animals with hearts) that give rise to 
general life functions, exhibited by all and only living machines. Heat, then, is bet-
ter seen as the principle of motion within living bodies, and not the principle of life 
itself, an option Descartes explicitly offers in the  Passions : “While we are alive 
there is a continual heat in our hearts, which is a kind of fi re that the blood of 
24  MacKenzie  1975 , 10. 
25  Ibid. 8–9. 
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the veins maintains there. The fi re is the corporeal principle underlying all the 
 movements of our limbs” (AT XI, 333/SV 23). 
 Recently, Distelzweig has provided another distinction that can help fi ll out 
 Descartes ’ conception of life, a distinction derived from the historical medical 
context in which Descartes was writing. Specifi cally, Distelzweig notes that the
 medical tradition employs  functio … to refer to and categorize a familiar, long established 
set of characteristic activities of living things.  Usus , in contrast, refers to the contribution a 
part of activity makes to the exercise of some  functio . Both parts and  functiones have  usus . 
The  usus of a part is the contribution it makes to the exercise of some  functio . The  usus of 
a  functio , in turn, is the contribution that  functio makes to some larger or more fundamental 
 functio , terminating ultimately in the list of main natural, vital and animal  functiones . 26 
 The distinction that Distelzweig draws our attention to focuses on the hierarchi-
cal nature of  usus and  functio , while MacKenzie’s distinction between life behav-
iors and life functions focuses on the differences between activities that a sub-class 
of living beings exhibit and activities exhibited by all living bodies. But they can be 
related to one another precisely because more localized parts and activities often 
tend to be unique to sub-classes of living beings, as Mackenzie’s specifi c examples 
underscore. 
 These basic distinctions seem right to me, though I differ from MacKenzie on a 
few points. First, I specify that growth is of a specifi c form, namely growth with 
bodily transformation – most notably the constant turnover of constitutive matter – 
and not mere growth by aggregation. In the  Description , for example,  Descartes 
writes: “we should bear in mind that the parts of all living bodies which require 
nutrition to sustain them (that is, animals and plants) are continually undergoing 
change” (AT XI, 247/CSM I, 319). Importantly, once foetal formation is complete, 
the visible organic structure is maintained despite the constant change in the subvis-
ible constitutive matter of organisms. Today, of course, we call this process metabo-
lism, and it is crucial to the enduring health and survival of living bodies. No other 
bodies grow in this fashion; it is a form of growth unique to plants, animals and 
human bodies. 
 Further, I include two more elements in the list of life functions beyond the three 
identifi ed by MacKenzie (i.e. nutrition, growth, and  generation ). These are, fi rst, the 
ability to react to the surrounding environment (including animals’ abilities to 
 sense , remember and learn considered as material, and not mental, processes) and, 
second and related, the ability to maintain the unifi ed structure of the body despite 
the wear and tear that follows from interaction with the surrounding environment. 
Lisa Shapiro identifi es these elements as providing a promising non-teleological 
criterion of health for both human bodies and animals – specifi cally, she claims that 
human bodies and animals have integrated structures that are stable and able to 
preserve themselves. Moreover, she connects staying healthy with the fact of a 
body’s being and staying  alive . So I take it that she would endorse this criterion as 
a necessary component of  Descartes ’ conception of life. Distelzweig ( 2015 ), too, 
accepts this account of life, emphasizing the  self -stabilizing aspect of all and 
26  Distelzweig  2015 . 
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only living beings, which is presumably captured by Shapiro’s mention of 
 self -preservation. 27 
 These additions are signifi cant for they indicate a crucial aspect of  Descartes ’ 
theory of life: living bodies perform their activities (e.g. digestion) to contribute to 
life functions (e.g. growth with transformation)  which helps them achieve the 
further goal of self-maintenance of a unifi ed structure of inter-related parts . This 
self- maintenance, in turn, permits the continuation of the life-specifi c behaviors and 
functions. So in addition to the sub-processes of localized parts within a specifi c 
subset of kinds of living bodies, which contribute to the most general, whole-body 
functions of all living bodies, I propose that Descartes’ conception of living bodies 
includes, as Shapiro notes, the further element of self-maintenance of a unifi ed 
structure of inter-related parts – or, more familiarly, self-preservation. Indeed, the other 
behaviors of living beings all contribute to this ultimate, most general behavior. 
 There is evidence that  Descartes takes the self-maintenance of a unifi ed structure 
adequate to permit continuing self-maintaining activities as a defi ning feature of 
living bodies. In  Passions , for example, Descartes writes: “For the [human] body is 
a unity which is in a  sense indivisible because of the arrangement of its organs, these 
being so related to one another that the removal of any one of them renders the 
whole body defective” (AT XI, 351/SV 35). Once this removal of an essential organ 
happens, death occurs (AT XI, 330/SV 21). Similarly, in  Treatise , Descartes sug-
gests that the living human body forms an integrated whole which, because of its 
“good condition” of parts into a whole, is able to maintain that whole from disinte-
grating (AT XI, 143-44/CSM I, 102–3; c.f. AT VIIIa, 318/CSM I, 282; and AT VI, 
153). Such passages indicate that the proper dispositions of parts to one another 
form a structurally integrated whole – what Des Chene calls “dispositional unity”. 28 
This whole of parts properly disposed to one another permits the machine to func-
tion in specifi c ways, which further allow it to maintain a stable structure, which is 
tantamount to engaging in self-preservation. 29 Notice that Descartes’ emphasis in 
the  Passions quotation is on the human  body , and so nothing turns on the presence 
of a  soul . As a result, claims he makes here are equally relevant to other living bod-
ies in so far as they exhibit a similar unifi ed arrangement of parts. These passages 
suggest that living machines could be those that are able to maintain a unifi ed struc-
ture of essential organic parts, and that they are able to do so through an internal 
principle of motion. Crucial to this account of life is the fact that living bodies are 
able to maintain their unifi ed structure through their  own functions, and do not 
require the interference of an external builder to maintain that structure. 
 Living machines, therefore, are distinguished from non-living machines as fol-
lows. First (as with MacKenzie), I believe  Descartes must appeal to both causes and 
effects in his account of what makes a body a living body. There are two causes one 
can fi nd in Descartes’ texts (these are the two criteria Ablondi takes as necessary 
and suffi cient for demarcating the living in Descartes). The fi rst cause is that living 
27  Shapiro  2003 , 433–434, including footnote 34. 
28  Des Chene  2001 , 125ff. 
29  Shapiro  2003 ,  passim . 
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bodies have their own internal source of motion, and given a charitable interpretation 
of Descartes’ own texts, this is the heat produced (even in plants) by rapidly moving 
particles. The second cause is that living bodies have a unique kind of God- made 
complexity. As with MacKenzie, I believe this complexity must be conceived of 
abstractly, and it is simply any kind of complexity that permits a specifi c collection 
of effects. And so, the effects are as follows. As with MacKenzie and Distelzweig 
(and bringing their two insights together), specifi c subclasses of living bodies 
engage in specifi c activities, which are often confi ned to local parts and processes. 
These are necessary preconditions for, and contribute to the more general, often 
whole-body, life functions that all plants, animals, and human bodies engage in. 
These life functions are nutrition, growth, and  generation (as with MacKenzie – 
though growth is of a unique kind whereby the body transforms as it grows), as well 
as the ability to respond to the environment, and the ability to maintain the complex 
structure of the body in the face of some wear and tear. Taken together, these abili-
ties contribute to the ultimate living function of self-preservation or self- maintenance 
of a stable structure (Shapiro), which in turn permits the continuation of the activi-
ties and life functions identifi ed above. 
 I ought to underscore one fi nal point about these living machines.  Descartes 
expects – and even goes to considerable lengths in order to try to realize this expec-
tation – that all these elements of living bodies can be fully explained in terms of 
bits of matter-as-extension within living bodies moving according to simple laws. 
That is, he fully expects us to give reductionist explanations of living phenomena, 
but this does not amount to the elimination of the category of living beings. 
Descartes’ austere ontology of the material world allows these powerful  mechanical 
explanation s within the life sciences, but does not thereby threaten the life sciences 
by stripping them of a subject of study. The fi rst problem mentioned at the outset of 
this paper is thus resolved. 
 There are signifi cant diffi culties for a Cartesian metaphysics with this conception 
of life. One, which I shall not address here, concerns issues in the metaphysics of 
individuation. In brief,  Descartes ’ own strict criterion of individuation of physical 
bodies as found in the context of his discussion of motion at  Principles II, 25 (AT 
VIIIa, 53-4/CSM I, 233) does not permit the constant fl ux of constitutive matter in 
a body considered to be the  same body through time. Thus, the (non-ensouled) liv-
ing body cannot be an enduring individual for Descartes, according to this concep-
tion of a material individual. I bracket this problem as one to be dealt with elsewhere, 
and I turn instead to a second diffi culty. 
 This is the problem of the role of  teleology in  Descartes ’ theory of life. For there 
is at least one juncture – and quite possibly more – at which teleology seems to enter 
in the conception of living bodies I have just developed as the conception to which 
I believe Descartes must be committed so as to vindicate his practice as a working 
scientist. But, to reiterate a well-known feature of Descartes’ natural philosophy, he 
cannot make claims to teleology (taken specifi cally as a refl ection of God’s pur-
poses) in natural philosophy, for God’s purposes are opaque to us. And so, Descartes’ 
theory of life may well rely upon illegitimate appeals to teleology. This diffi culty 
will occupy the remainder of this paper. 
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7.2  Descartes ’ Theory of Life and  Teleology 
 In this section, my general approach is as follows. If any aspect of  Descartes ’ theory 
of life requires an appeal to teleological purposes, then the second problem just 
identifi ed arises. While there may be more than one way in which Descartes’ theory 
of living bodies relies upon such purposes, all I need in order to proceed with my 
investigation of Descartes’ theory of life and the related topic of method in his study 
of living bodies is one case where his theory relies upon appeals to teleological 
purposes. So I proceed by identifying just one such case and progressing to my 
proposed solution to the problem that arises for him as a result of this  teleology . 
 Now it may seem that there is no diffi culty since, despite appearances,  Descartes 
does not rely upon  teleology in his account of living bodies. He may rely heavily on 
 functionality , but this is quite distinct from teleology. Shapiro ( 2003 ), as indicated 
above, provides a non-teleological account of the apparently normative concept of 
health, and to the extent that good health indicates continuing  life , her account can 
extend to life as well. More pointedly, Deborah Brown ( 2013 ) explicitly offers a 
powerfully argued, non-teleological account of functions in Descartes’ discussion 
of living bodies. I return to aspects of Brown’s paper below. 
 However, Distelzweig argues that some of the uses of organic parts that appear 
in  Descartes ’ medical writings rely upon fi nal causal explanations of those parts. 
For at times, Descartes discusses parts and processes in terms of their uses in con-
tributing to a function – that is, the parts are present  because they serve the purpose 
of fulfi lling certain functions. These are examples of illegitimate reliance upon  tele-
ology . Distelzweig discusses two such cases, namely Descartes’ discussion of the 
number of membranes in the mitral valve of the heart in the fi fth part of the  Discourse 
(where his concern is with the human  body and not the human composite) and his 
discussion of the  senses in the sixth part of the  Meditations . According to 
Distelzweig, in these cases Descartes holds that the body has specifi c parts or pro-
cesses  so as to be able to achieve at least some of the functions, which are defi nitive 
of them as living bodies. Ignoring the case of the senses (for this introduces the 
troublesome case of the human composite, which I will not address in this paper), 
the fact that Descartes employs teleological explanation in the case of the heart is 
problematic. For this example shows that in the case of the human body’s heart and 
its mitral valves, a part and the processes that part undergoes, exist  so as to realize 
a specifi c end or purpose . Thus a specifi c living activity of a subclass of living 
beings relies, in Descartes’ analysis, upon a teleological explanation. If this is so, 
then at least some members of the domain of life (human bodies) are identifi ed by 
at least one part and related process that are depicted teleologically. There may be 
other such examples, but as mentioned above, one is all I need for my purposes. 
Such teleologically-based explanations cannot be permitted on a Cartesian natural 
philosophy. So one of the effects, which go into the theoretical account I have pro-
vided of living bodies in Descartes’ corpus, runs into diffi culties. 
 Distelzweig further points out that teleological explanations might be grounded 
in one of a couple of different ways, neither of which is open to  Descartes . The way 
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I portray the nest of issues in what follow departs somewhat from Distelzweig’s 
own way of laying out the conceptual terrain, but my portrayal is meant to bring out 
certain features of the terrain that I will need for what follows. I do not think that 
what I write here distorts Distelzweig’s own understanding. The fi rst way one might 
ground a teleological explanation relies upon the ontological priority of the whole 
to its parts such that the parts, systems and living functions and behaviors are there 
 because of and  to serve the purpose of preserving the whole animal. Distelzweig 
further argues that Descartes’ theory of  generation precludes this option, because 
according to his theory of generation, the parts come into being one after another 
and only  after they have come into being does the whole begin to function. There 
are two ways in which this  temporal priority of parts to whole might co-exist with 
an  ontological priority of whole to parts. Both routes rely upon saying that there was 
always a plan of the whole, and that the plan included the fact that the whole would 
function so as to be self-preserving. The plan is what determines that the parts come 
into existence, one by one, and take on their fi nished, whole form. One way in 
which this general strategy could play out is to rely upon the Aristotelian substantial 
form, passed from male to female in sexual reproduction; this form carries with it 
the plan of the whole such that the parts form precisely in order to generate the 
whole and to serve the purpose of the self-preservation of the whole. Descartes’ 
austere ontology precludes this approach; there can be no such form. The other way 
in which this general strategy could play out is to suppose that the plan is in the 
mind of a conscious builder of the whole such that the parts again are there because 
they serve the plan of creating a whole that is able to preserve itself through its life 
functions. This is the second option Distelzweig claims is closed to Descartes, for 
the conscious mind in the case of living bodies is God’s – God intended for the 
parts, systems and their functions to be so-and-so in order to contribute to God’s 
further purposes which may include the ability of a living body to preserve itself. 
And yet, Descartes unequivocally precludes making reference to God’s intentions. 
It is this second option that I will interrogate in the remains of this paper. 
 Up to, and perhaps throughout, the early modern period, there were two general 
forms of  teleology , even while there may also have been more forms that blended 
features of these two basic forms together. We may think of these as Platonic and 
Aristotelian forms of teleology. 30 In brief, according to Aristotelian teleology, some 
natural beings embody an immanent drive to fulfi ll purposes or achieve an end or 
goal that is their own end or goal, and they usually do so non-consciously or non- 
intentionally. Moreover, according to Aristotelian teleology, the intrinsic  drive 
towards an end means that the effi cient cause is end-directed; it is not the uniform, 
non-directed inertial motion we fi nd in, for example,  Descartes ’ conception of effi -
cient cause. 31 The Aristotelian model thus includes the belief that some natural 
beings have an intrinsic teleological  nature such that explanations of their purposes 
30  For some helpful texts on thinking about different conceptual and historical issues in  teleology /
fi nal causation, see for example: Lennox  1985 ; Lennox  1992 ; Johnson  2005 ; Mayr  1992 ; and 
Detlefsen  2013 . 
31  See Carriero  2005 . 
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can be grounded in the nature of the being itself, and not in something external to 
the being. According to Platonic, unnatural teleology, created beings have been 
designed by an external, conscious and intentional agent to fulfi ll the goals or ends 
of the agent; the craftsman model is paradigmatic. The Platonic model thus includes 
the belief that beings created by a craftsman may have no internal teleological 
 nature such that explanations of their purposes must be grounded in claims about 
the intentions of its maker, and not in something internal to the being itself. 32 As 
noted, there are blended forms of these two basic types of teleology. Aquinas, for 
example, believes that God creates natural beings with purposes in mind (Platonic 
teleology), but that he conveys these purposes in non-conscious form upon the natural 
beings such that they can share in God’s purposes – albeit non-consciously – thus 
having an intrinsic teleological nature (Aristotelian teleology). 33 
 Descartes ’ living bodies are ontologically  only matter (taking on various sizes, 
shapes, speeds of motion and so forth) in lawful, inertial motion. For this  reason , 
with respect to living bodies (the case of the ensouled human being may well be 
very different, of course), Descartes cannot rely upon Aristotelian  teleology as the 
appropriate form of teleology to explain his reliance on  teleological functions in his 
conception of life – wherever his functional accounts are, indeed, teleological, as in 
the case of the mitral valves in the heart. 
 Rather, if he is going to rely upon either of the forms of  teleology under consid-
eration, it would seem to have to be Platonic teleology: God built living bodies, he 
had purposes in mind with respect to those bodies and their parts when he built them 
(i.e. that they would function in specifi c ways), and those purposes are in the mind 
of God and in no way (unconsciously) held in the body. Bodies have no internal 
teleological nature, and so explanations about their purposes must make reference 
to the mind of God as the source and sole location of those purposes. In one  sense , 
this is promising because Platonic teleology is wholly compatible with the ontology 
of living bodies as matter in lawful motion. But in another sense, this approach may 
seem doomed – and this is the source of Distelzweig’s dismissal of this approach as 
a viable option for  Descartes . That is, Descartes cannot seem to go this route 
because, according to Descartes, we do not know the purposes that God had in mind 
when he constructed the bodies of the world, and those purposes are to be found 
nowhere else but in the mind of God. Consequently, Descartes famously argues, we 
cannot rely upon those hidden purposes when investigating natural bodies:
 When dealing with natural things, we will, then, never derive any explanations from the 
purposes, which God or nature may have had in view when creating them and we shall 
entirely banish from our philosophy the search for fi nal causes . For we should not be so 
arrogant as to suppose that we can share in God’s plans . We should, instead, consider him 
as the effi cient cause of all things… (AT VIIIa, 15-6/CSM I, 202; emphasis added). 
 So  Descartes seems to have no theory of  teleology to rely upon in order to explain 
the functions of the living body – the functions which  defi ne living bodies – should 
32  For a development of these points and their impact on  Descartes ’ conception of the mind-body 
human composite, see Detlefsen  2013 . 
33  See, for example, Aquinas [1265–72]  1952 –4. 
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these functions be teleological. But there  is at least one such case of a teleological 
function, i.e. the case of the mitral valves in the human body’s heart. So Descartes 
relies upon teleology in this case, but seems to have no viable theory of teleology at 
hand to support this reliance. There’s the problem. 
 But there is a part of my elaboration of the Aristotelian versus Platonic scheme 
given above that I think is too stark and understanding how it is so opens up a new 
possibility for thinking about  teleology in  Descartes . The overly stark characteriza-
tion is in the claim that the Cartesian/Platonic model includes the belief that mate-
rial bodies (ultimately consisting of only extended matter) that are created by God 
have no internal teleological  nature and that thus, explanations of their purposes 
must be grounded  entirely in claims about the God’s intentions, and not in some-
thing internal to the bodies themselves. 34 I don’t think this is true, and I don’t think 
Descartes could have held it to be true. Rather, I think Descartes is implicitly – and 
correctly – committed to the belief that wholly material bodies (where matter is 
extension) can, and in some way do,  embody their builder’s purposes . Specifi cally, 
for my current purposes, I think Descartes is implicitly – and correctly – committed 
to the belief that living bodies can, and in some way do, embody God’s purposes 
such that we can make claims to those purposes without relying upon especially 
robust knowledge claims about purposes in God’s mind. In the next section, I will 
provide textual and conceptual evidence for this claim as well as situating my claims 
about Descartes in historical developments about bodies and teleology. 
7.3  Natures and  Teleology 
 On the face of it, the claim that wholly material bodies on a Cartesian ontology can, 
in a  sense , have internal ends communicated to them by God would seem to be dead 
in the water. It would seem to be indisputable that matter conceived of as only 
extension  cannot , by its very ontological nature,  embody purposes of a mind – 
whether that be the mind of a human who builds a clock, for example, or the mind 
of God who builds a living body. Moreover, the claim that such matter can embody 
the purposes of a conscious mind may seem to fl y in the face of  Descartes ’ own 
enunciation of that non-purposive ontology of matter as found in Meditation VI, 
especially when we focus on the italicized portions of this passage (and breeze over 
the underlined portions, which I will discuss below):
 [A] clock constructed with wheels and weights observes all the laws of its nature just as 
closely  when it is badly made and tells the wrong time as when it completely fulfi lls the 
wishes of the clockmaker . In the same way, I might consider the body of a man as a kind of 
machine…. I can easily see that if such a body suffers from dropsy, for example, and is 
affected by the dryness of the throat which normally produces in the mind the sensation of 
34  Manning ( 2012 , 252) notes that it is a “serious misreading” to interpret  Descartes ’ extrinsic 
denominations, such as the health or illness of a human being, as entirely mind-dependent and in 
no way in the human being itself. I agree, though I do not focus on extrinsic denomination. 
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thirst, the resulting condition of the nerves and other parts will dispose the body to take a 
drink,  with the result that the disease will be aggravated .  Yet this is just as natural as the 
body’s being stimulated by a similar dryness of the throat to take a drink  when there is no 
such illness and the drink is benefi cial . Admittedly, when I consider the purpose of the 
clock, I may say that it is departing from its nature  when it does not tell the right time ; and 
similarly when I consider the mechanisms of the human body, I may think that, in relation 
to the movements which normally occur in it, it too is deviating from its nature  if the throat 
is dry at a time when drinking is not benefi cial to its continued health . But I am well aware 
that ‘nature’ as I have just used it has a very different signifi cance from ‘nature’ in the other 
 sense [as applied to the human composite].  As I have just used it, ‘nature’ is simply a label, 
which depends on my thought; it is quite extraneous to the things to which it is applied…. 
But by ‘nature’ in the other sense I understand something, which is really to be found in the 
things themselves; in this sense, therefore, the term contains something of the truth. 
 When we say, then, with respect to the body suffering from dropsy, that it has a disor-
dered nature because it has a dry throat and yet does not need drink, the term ‘nature’ here 
is used merely as an extraneous label. However, with respect to the composite, that is, the 
mind united with the body, what is involved is not a mere label, but a true error of nature, 
namely that the body is thirsty at a time when drink is going to cause the body harm . 
(AT VII, 82-5/CSM II, 57–9; emphases added; trans alt.) 
 Focusing especially on the passages emphasized in italics,  Descartes says explic-
itly that the supposed goal-directed ‘nature’ of clocks and human bodies considered 
solely in terms of their matter is a mere label, refl ecting only purpose in my mind 
and is “is quite extraneous to the things to which it is applied”. Material bodies are 
contrasted with mind-body composites, or human beings, in this passage, and 
human beings, unlike mere bodies,  do have goal-directed natures. 35 So the obvious 
question is: how possibly can I suggest that non-ensouled bodies can embody  in 
their natures the purposes given to them by a conscious mind – how possibly can I 
suggest that wholly material bodies can have internal ends – when Descartes appears 
to deny precisely that? 
 To answer that question, let me distinguish among the following three topics: the 
natures of things and  teleology ; epistemology and teleology; and  methodology and 
teleology. With respect to the natures of things and teleology, I make the further 
distinction between the ontologically basic nature of matter (ground fl oor meta-
physics, if you will, or matter-as-extension in the case of  Descartes ) and the 
 derivative nature of matter (the nature of visible physical bodies made up out of 
matter-as-extension). As Gary Hatfi eld has pointed out, Descartes himself acknowl-
edges these two different kinds of natures, including that living bodies have natures 
 qua visible living wholes (e.g. VIIIa: 53; IXb: 14). 36 
 With respect to the natures of things and  teleology , it is fruitful to ask whether or 
not a material being can embody, in its very nature, the purposes of a conscious 
mind (its maker, for example); can material beings possess internal ends? But that 
question can be further specifi ed to ask two sub-questions: can a body considered 
35  Manning ( 2012 ) deals with this section of Meditation VI by focusing on the historical meaning 
of “extrinsic denomination” and “intrinsic denomination”. My project, as will come clear, is a dif-
ferent one, and I believe it is, for the most part, compatible with Manning’s approach. There is one 
point of departure from Manning’s reading, which I address below. 
36  See Hatfi eld  2008 , 416–17. 
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solely as matter-as-extension have, in its very nature, internal ends?; and can a 
body of a clock or a dog, for example, made up out of matter-as-extension, have 
internal ends? 
 With respect to epistemology and  teleology , it is fruitful to ask whether or not we 
can know the purposes of a thing, whether those purposes be embodied in a material 
being (internal ends) or whether those purposes be in a conscious mind and thus 
wholly external to the material being. 
 With respect to  methodology and  teleology , it is fruitful to ask whether there is a 
methodologically respectable way of relying upon appeals to purposes when 
explaining features of material beings (that is, in natural philosophy), whether those 
purposes belong to the natures of material beings or not, and whether we can defi ni-
tively know what those purposes are or not. In this section, I deal with natures and 
teleology. In the next (fi nal) section, I deal with the latter two issues of epistemology 
and methodology. 
 The italicized portions of the above-cited passage suggest that there is one kind 
of internal ends only, i.e. that which is found in the mind-body composite. Bodies 
without souls (or considered counter-factually in isolation from a  soul , as in the case 
of the human body) do not possess such ends. Material bodies are, in their ontologi-
cal nature, only extension of various sizes, shapes, moving in various directions and 
at various speeds, always in accordance with three basic laws of inertial motion. 
They have no goal-directed nature within themselves. 
 The underlined portions of the above-cited passage, however,  rely upon bodies 
without souls possessing internal ends. If there were truly no difference in the nature 
of different clocks or different living human bodies, then the distinction between a 
clock that is “badly made and tells the wrong time” and a clock that “completely 
fulfi lls the wishes of the clockmaker” would be nonsensical; no such distinction 
could meaningfully be made. The same can be said for the distinction between a 
living human body and a dead human body.  Descartes makes this strict parallel 
when he writes:
 And let us judge that the body of a living man differs as much from that of a dead man as a 
watch or other automaton when it is in good working order and has in itself the corporeal 
principle of the movements for which it is instituted with all that is required for its action, 
[differs from] the same watch or other machine when it is broken and the principle of its 
action has ceased to act. (AT XI, 331/SV 21) 37 
 Making the distinctions between a clock or a human body that works well/is 
healthy and alive and a clock or a human body that works poorly/is ill or dead relies 
upon those bodies possessing some kind of internal fi nality, or embodying the pur-
poses of their makers, such that when those purposes are realized by the body, 
37  I have chosen to focus on living and dead humans, and their symmetry with working and broken 
watches, rather than to focus on the dropsy case because of the special, theological, context of the 
Sixth Meditation, where  Descartes is trying to make  sense of God’s goodness in the face of appar-
ent biological mistakes. While important (Brown  2013 , 90ff), and I shall address this passage 
briefl y below, I wish to keep the focus on the nature of living bodies and the ways in which under-
standing clocks can help us understand certain features of living bodies. 
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the body works well/is healthy and alive, and such that when those purposes are not 
realized by the body, the body works poorly/is sick or dead. Or, to quote  Descartes 
himself, a clock itself can “fulfi ll the wishes of the clockmaker”, or fail to fulfi ll 
those wishes, which include the purposes the clock maker had in mind when build-
ing the clock,  and the success or failure is a feature of the clock itself . To maintain 
the strict parallel at work in this passage, a living body can fulfi ll the wishes of God 
who made that body, or fail to fulfi ll those wishes, which include the purposes God 
had in mind when building the body,  and the success or failure is a feature of the 
living body itself . 
 To approach the point from a different – and I think highly instructive – direction, 
consider the following example. Suppose I wish to make something that can convey 
to you, with a fair degree of precision, where the sun is in the sky relative to your 
location on earth. How do I do that? One way I can do it is by building a machine 
with two long sticks of slightly differing lengths that sweep around a circular sur-
face such that when the sun is directly overhead of the spot on the equator where 
you fi nd yourself, for example, the two sticks point straight up, and such that when 
the sun is either dipping down over the horizon or popping up over the horizon, the 
big hand points up and the little hand points down, and so forth. Similar descriptions 
can be given for a sun dial and other mechanisms built with the intention of telling 
time. I  cannot ever convey to you where the sun is in the sky relative to your posi-
tion on earth – that is, I can never  tell you the time – by spilling one small drop of 
coffee on the fl oor in a room that has no access to natural light, no matter how insis-
tently I say that producing a time-telling device was my purpose in spilling that 
single drop of coffee. The former machine can embody my purposes  vis a vis time- 
telling, and it can convey those purposes to you in a way that the drop of coffee can 
never do. These facts remain true regardless of what I claim my intentions are. So: 
I have an intention (e.g. build something that tells the time) that requires I use mate-
rial of specifi c sorts, organized in specifi c ways, and that once I build that thing such 
that it can successfully convey my intention to another conscious mind, then the 
object I have built embodies those intentions in a way that a drop of coffee, on this 
example, cannot do. 
 Where is the difference between these two material bodies, given that on a 
Cartesian ontology, the built machine and the drop of coffee both have the same, 
ontologically basic material nature (extension), and both inviolably obey the same 
laws of motion? Here is where the further distinction in the discussion of natures 
and  teleology is helpful. For the temptation to say that material bodies are simply 
not the sorts of things that can embody internal fi nality, especially in light of the 
Sixth Meditation passage cited, can surely be said about material bodies considered 
in terms of their ontologically basic nature but this need not apply to bodies consid-
ered in terms of their derivative, built natures. For if there were no internal ends 
embodied in built machines (clocks built by humans or living bodies built by God), 
then no  sense could be made of the idea of a clock  being broken (i.e. failing to con-
vey my purposes to you) when the hands don’t move, or the idea of the body being 
defective when the mitral valves in the heart, for example, fail to open. Yet  Descartes 
takes these ideas of deviation from well-working/health in the case of wholly 
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material bodies as givens and as completely sensible (and he is right to do so). The 
underlined portions of the passage cite above establish this. 38 
 Descartes recognizes these facts, and he does so specifi cally with respect to liv-
ing bodies. For example, he claims that we humans could never build a bird, because 
we could never make matter that is appropriate for building a living bird (AT III, 
163). Similarly, he claims we could never make ourselves a new body, for we cannot 
make such matter (AT VI, 148). In these claims, he recognizes that, despite the 
ground-fl oor ontological sameness of bird bodies, human bodies, clocks and so on, 
matter in its derivative forms can allow or not allow certain machines, presumably 
with certain purposes, to be built. 
 So the Sixth Meditation passage makes distinctions among three – not two – 
different ways of thinking about bodies. One kind of body is the ensouled body of 
the composite, and these bodies have a goal-directed nature internal to them; they 
have internal fi nality of a unique sort grounded in their unique ontological nature as 
ensouled bodies. I will say no more about this special, and theoretically compli-
cated, being in  Descartes ’ ontology. There is a second kind of body that can be 
thought of in two different ways. This is the wholly material body, such as the 
human-built clock or the God-built living body. Thought of in terms of its ground- 
fl oor metaphysical nature, i.e. its constitutive matter-as-extension, such a body is in 
no way goal-directed; it is only matter in lawful inertial motion. But thought of in 
terms of its derivative physical nature, i.e. matter of a derivative kind structured in 
very particular ways, such a body can have internal ends, sharing in the purposes 
that a human or God had in mind when building it, even while this sort of internal 
fi nality may be very different from that found in the human composite. 39 
 Let me be explicit about what I am and am not claiming about this third way of 
thinking about bodies, according to which wholly material bodies can have natures 
that include internal ends. Some conceptual-historical background will help here. 
Aristotelian ontology makes a difference in kind between living bodies and artifacts 
because the former have all four causes internal to them. Indeed, he even goes so far 
as to say that the formal cause (or substantial form), the effi cient cause (or internal 
principle of change), and the fi nal cause (the drive to a telos or end point) are one 
and the same cause within living bodies. In artifacts, by contrast, bodies themselves 
have only the formal and the material causes within themselves. Effi cient and fi nal 
causes are external to bodies, namely in the craftsman who builds the artifacts. 
According to one crude depiction, Cartesian mechanisms makes all bodies, includ-
ing living bodies, into Aristotelian artifacts. But Aristotle is moved by a pre- 
theoretical, and entirely common  sense , understanding of artifacts, and that is that 
a craftsman can’t build just anything out of any old matter. I cannot build a statue 
of a deer out of warm water; warm water does not have a suitable  nature to be 
fashioned into a statue of a deer. Warm water is not the sort of matter that can bear 
38  For historical context that helps to bolster this idea, see Manning on extrinsic denominations 
( 2012 ). 
39  On this point, I depart from a number of commentators. See Hoffman  1986 and  1999 ; Ariew 
 1983 ; Grene  1986 and  1991 ; Gueroult  1952 ; and Rodis-Lewis  1950 . 
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my purposes in this case. Aristotle has a theoretical way to account for this 
pre- theoretical and common sense intuition: no matter is completely un-informed 
in his view. Matter is always  informed with some form or another. That is what 
makes warm water different, in kind, from marble. Ridding his ontology of this 
robust, Aristotelian conception of form may rob  Descartes of this way of accounting 
for the pre-theoretical, and entirely common sense, intuition. But it does not dis-
pense with the intuition in the fi rst place. And it is an intuition that Descartes shares 
with Aristotle. This is shown by his acknowledgment that we could never build a 
living bird or make ourselves a new body, for we cannot make matter of the appro-
priate nature. No less than Aristotle (or any common sense, pre-theoretical view), 
Descartes believes that craftspeople must use material of a particular nature if they 
wish to build an artifact that can bear their ends. 40 
 What I am claiming is the following.  Descartes maintains the Aristotelian intu-
ition about material natures that can embody a builder’s ends – that can have inter-
nal ends, that is. This nature is presupposed by the distinctions he makes between a 
clock that works well and a clock that doesn’t (indeed, to use my example, between 
a clock that is able, in the fi rst place, to tell time and a drop of coffee that is not so 
able), and between a human body that is alive and one that is dead. Maintaining this 
intuition is perfectly sensible, and it would a be non-starter were Descartes to deny 
this pre-theoretical, common  sense , understanding of bodies. For Descartes, this 
material nature capable of bearing internal ends is  not to be found in the ontological 
essence of matter as extension but is rather to be found in the derivative nature of 
medium-sized matter shaped in various ways. However, I am not able, here, to fur-
ther spell out the precise ontology of this derivative nature that has internal ends; 
indeed, given Descartes’ rejection of Aristotelian ontology of informed matter, I am 
not sure his new austere ontology can allow for a derivative nature of material bod-
ies with internal ends. 41 Specifi cally, I am not sure his own conception of matter of 
three kinds, depending upon the relative size and speed of motion of their constitu-
tive parts, is up to the task of accounting for the kind of matter needed to build living 
bodies. But he assumes bodies with such natures, and it is a sensible assumption. 42 
 One fi nal, crucial comment is in order. The question of God’s making a body to 
fulfi ll certain purposes is distinct from, albeit intimately connected with, the ques-
tion of the  value or  normative goodness of how well a body fulfi lls those purposes. 
40  For helpful material on Aristotle on many of these points, see Kosman  1987 . 
41  Michael Della Rocca has suggested (in correspondence) that in creating the eternal truths, God 
has imposed natures on things, thereby endowing them with an intrinsic character. Indeed, in the 
case of God’s creations, it might be more plausible to make the claim that his products can embody 
internal purposes. This would bolster my interpretation here, though my argument proceeds by 
analogy from the familiar case of human-made machines to the case of God-made machines. 
42  Tad Schmaltz has recently developed a convincing argument in favor of an unconscious, 
Aristotelian-type internal fi nality in human composites. See “ Descartes ’s Critique of Scholastic 
 Teleology ” (manuscript). The current conception of intrinsic ends relies more upon a conscious 
agent’s ability to  signal her purposes, through very specifi c uses of matter, to another conscious 
agent. The current form thus leans more toward a Platonic form, albeit with the Aristotelian ele-
ment of the purposes also being embodied in a non-conscious being. 
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Brown draws our attention to the issue of normative value in her non-teleological 
account of bodily functions, underscoring that a non-teleological account of living 
functions has the benefi t of accounting for life activities without God being culpable 
for mistakes in the body such as dropsy and death. 43 My account here cannot simi-
larly avoid this diffi culty so easily, though this is not to say that there is therefore no 
solution to this problem. But the fact remains that  Descartes does rely upon  teleol-
ogy in the case of the mitral valves. One way to explain that reliance is to couple his 
own strict parallel between clocks (for example) and living bodies with his embrace 
of the pre-theoretical acknowledgment that clocks can embody or fail to embody 
our purposes, and then conclude that for Descartes, living material bodies can simi-
larly embody or fail to embody God’s purposes. This may saddle Descartes with the 
problem of God’s culpability, but the alternative would be to leave his teleological 
claims unexplained. 
7.4  Epistemology, Method, and Internal Ends 
 Still, to complicate the current account and to set the stage for thinking about epis-
temology and  teleology , as well as  methodology and teleology, imagine someone 
who has never seen a clock before and has no previous knowledge of human-made 
time telling devices. 44 Such a person may come across my large and heavy clock and 
wonder what it is and what it does. She may carefully observe it working over the 
course of several days and stumble across my true purpose in building it by noticing 
that the two sticks both point upwards when the sun is directly overhead or in the 
depths of night, and that the big stick points up and the little stick points down just 
when the sun rises or sets on the horizon and so forth. That person might come to 
understand that my clock will be very handy in conveying to her certain information 
about the position of the sun when she is in a basement room without access to natu-
ral light. Alternatively, this person may notice that my large and heavy clock is very 
handy in holding open the door to her basement room, and she might then conclude 
that it was made for this purpose. Indeed, the physical clock is made of materials 
that can serve this purpose too, though that was not  my purpose when I built it. 
 Crucially, the clock is different from the living body for  Descartes in the  sense 
that the decoder of the clock can always ask me, or another human with knowledge 
of the true purpose that clockmakers have in mind, what internal ends the clock is 
supposed to embody according to its builder. Then the knowledgeable person can 
directly convey the purposes of the clockmaker. God’s purposes are, according to 
Descartes, inscrutable and buried in the abyss of his wisdom. There is no asking 
God what he intended, and we cannot, without hubris, pretend to know his purposes, 
43  Brown  2013 , 89–90. 
44  In  Dialogues on Natural Religion , David Hume, of course, considers this question and provides 
a response that is especially interesting for the chaos theory, which I note is beyond the scope of 
this current project. 
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even though they may seem to be on full display in the parts, processes and behaviors 
of the living bodies he has made (such as Gassendi claims: AT VII, 309; CSM II, 
215). This brings us to the issues of  teleology and epistemology, and teleology 
and  methodology . 
 We have arrived at this point: conscious minds can convey purposes to bodies 
themselves, not in so far as we consider body as matter-as-extension, but in so far as 
we consider body as structured, visible machines made up out of matter-as- 
extension. 45 Still, in the case of living bodies for  Descartes , we cannot  know what 
purposes God might have conveyed to them when he created them, and so we 
cannot make use of  teleology in our natural philosophy at all. This epistemological 
block seems to thwart my attempt to vindicate Descartes’ teleologically laced 
conception of living bodies. 
 There is no doubt that  Descartes ’ insistence that we cannot  know God’s purposes 
is meant to translate into the requirement that we never use teleological explana-
tions in natural philosophy, including in our theories about living beings. But I think 
he goes too far in his precluding teleological explanations in natural philosophy, and 
I think there is a way he  could have , and perhaps even  should have made use of such 
explanations for a richer, more powerful natural philosophy. Specifi cally, he could 
have included teleological explanations on the basis of their being hypothetical 
explanations grounded in natural investigations of the internal ends found within 
living bodies themselves. It is true that Descartes explicitly rejects this method-
ological tool, but he may have been wrong to do so, and he loses so much more than 
he gains as a result of his rejection. 
 To set the stage for my suggestion, imagine again the person with no previous 
knowledge of human-made time-telling devices. She has decided that the purpose 
of my large and heavy clock is to prop open the door to her basement room. Suppose 
then, she comes across a small analogue pocket watch that resembles my clock in 
many ways though not in its size and weight, and that keeps time in perfect tandem 
with my clock. The similarity in most aspects of these two machines’ structures, and 
in the behaviors they exhibit, are not lost on the imaginary observer. She then con-
cludes that, while my clock does indeed do a wonderful job of holding open her 
door, there may well be a different purpose in the mind of the clock’s builder – and 
embodied in the clock itself – than the one she originally attributed to the builder 
and clock. The more she comes across similar devices, the more she may investigate 
what may be the true purpose of my clock, at least as I intended it, and of similar 
machines; she may even latch upon my true purpose should she conclude that my 
clock is meant to tell people where in the sky the sun is. Of course, if she does not 
ask me my true purpose that I have embodied in the clock, she cannot claim that she 
45  Manning’s ( 2012 , 262) approach to the issue of health in the human and extension of this teleo-
logical notion to non-human living bodies, is to employ the historical conception of extrinsic 
denominations to attribute teleological notions of health and illness to human bodies themselves, 
and then extending these conclusions to animals due to their likeness to the living human body. My 
approach is to focus on the process of making machines, and the intentional imparting of purposes 
in that process, and to fi nd a way we can depend upon that without depending upon  knowledge 
claims about God’s purposes. 
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indubitably  knows that she has latched upon my true purpose embodied in the clock. 
But the more evidence she gathers in the form of different examples of a wide vari-
ety of devices, which behave in a uniform way (i.e. successfully conveying the posi-
tion of the sun relative to the person standing on the equator) despite all their 
material variety, the more she will be justifi ed in thinking that her belief about my 
clock is probably a true belief; she may come to have what  Descartes calls “moral 
certainty” that her belief is true. 
 This approach captures the way of  hypotheses to which  Descartes is very friendly 
starting at least from the time of the  Discourse and texts attached to the  Discourse . 46 
Descartes believes that fi rst principles of philosophy set the confi nes for all of natu-
ral philosophy. But those principles radically underdetermine what could be true of 
bodies in the natural world. Most crucially, matter-as-extension and the three simple 
laws of motion, could have given rise to many different phenomena, most of which 
do not obtain in our actual world (e.g. AT VI, 64; CSM I, 144). And so the natural 
philosopher observes what is true of our world and proceeds to hypothesize (or sup-
pose or guess) about the exact mechanisms, which might have given rise to the 
world we have – all the while respecting the fi rst principles. This general approach 
to and reliance upon hypotheses carries through to Descartes’ later works where he 
develops details of his approach to hypotheses more fully. 
 Historically, there have been two key directions in which thinking about  hypoth-
eses developed, indeed from Ancient times, and certainly throughout the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries as well. According to one approach – typifi ed by 
Ptolemy in pre-modern thought and sometimes associated with ‘save the phenom-
ena’ type explanations – hypotheses are posited merely because they are useful 
instruments, mere mathematical calculating devices especially useful for prediction 
and scientifi c practice. The aim with hypotheses, according to this approach, is not 
to propose a  true account of the nature of things, since reaching true conclusions 
about the world is not necessarily relevant when formulating hypotheses according 
to this tradition, which focuses more pointedly on prediction. According to the sec-
ond approach – typifi ed by Aristotle in pre-modern thought and sometimes associ-
ated with causal explanations – hypotheses are posited in order to provide an 
explanation of how experienced effects might have come about. The aim is to give 
a  true account of the nature of things, especially the causal nature of things. 47 In the 
 Principles ,  Descartes comes down much more fi rmly on the side of hypotheses 
aiming for a true account of causes rather than on the side of hypotheses aiming 
simply to save the phenomena. 48 His reasoning in the later work captures something 
46  This aspect of  Descartes ’ method is far more complex – and interesting – than I make out here. 
For some work on Descartes and  hypotheses , see Clarke  1989 and  2011 ; Lauden  1981 ; McMullin 
 2000 and  2008 ; Sakellariadis  1982 ; and Detlefsen  forthcoming . 
47  For more on these two approaches to hypothesis, including the understanding of those such as 
 Kepler and Galileo who believed these methods to be compatible, see McMullin  2000 and 
Friedman  2008 , 71. 
48  There is a moment in the  Principles when he seems to allow for the latter use of  hypotheses , 
but a careful reading of this passage leaves open the distinct possibility that what is going on in 
the passage is  Descartes ’ recognition of their lack of certainty, not their mere instrumentality. 
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implicit, yet crucial, found in his letter to Morin of 13 July 1638 where he suggests 
that any hypothesis which accounts for multiple effects, including those not origi-
nally under investigation, is likely ‘the true cause from which they [effects] result’ 
(AT II, 199/CSMK 107). That is, should hypothesized causes explain a plethora of 
effects, including others not initially under investigation, then this simplicity and 
systematicity indicates that the hypotheses are probably true. He repeats this idea in 
the  Principles (PP III, §43-4; AT VIIIa, 98-9/CSM I, 255). 
 This point connects with a signifi cant feature of  Descartes ’ account of  hypothe-
ses in the  Principles , and this captures a development in scientifi c epistemology, 
which Desmond Clarke and Ernan McMullin have recently detailed. They note, that 
is, that some natural philosophers were moving away from treating less than certain 
knowledge in the form of hypotheses as merely speculative and thus unhelpful in 
scientifi c investigations. Rather, these natural philosophers believed that hypotheti-
cal claims carry important, even if not indubitably true, scientifi c information. That 
is, such philosophers were moving toward treating such knowledge as more or less 
probable, and therefore, more or less respectable. The degree of probability enjoyed 
by such hypotheses depends upon a number of factors, including, as suggested by 
Descartes, how simple and systematic they are. 49 Clarke thus points out that, 
throughout the 1600s, a new scientifi c epistemology emerged which allowed for a 
respectable, because not wholly speculative, category of the probable. Shortly after 
Descartes’ time, this more palatable notion of probability is clearly articulated by 
Edme Mariotte in his  Essai de logique ( 1678 ): ‘An hypothesis of one system is more 
probable than that of another if, by assuming it, one explains all the phenomena or 
a greater number of phenomena more exactly, more clearly and with a stronger link 
with other known things…’. 50 Three quarters of a century later, Émilie Du Châtelet 
would provide a theoretical account of hypotheses and their role in science, which 
fully articulated this powerful new scientifi c eistemology. 51 In his later work, 
Descartes seems to embrace such a conception of probability, retreating from an 
all-out claim to the certain truth of hypothesized causes (PP IV, §204; AT VIIIa, 
327/CSM I, 289), even while claiming ‘moral certainty’ of their truth (PP IV, §205; 
AT VIIIa, 327-28/CSM I, 289–90). That is, while not metaphysically certain, 
Descartes’ own posited hypotheses and conclusions derived from them are, in his 
view, not thereby mere arbitrary speculation. They are scientifi cally useful despite 
not being indubitably true. 52 
(See PP III, §44; AT VIIIa, 99/CSM I, 255). The preponderance of Descartes’ claims indicates that 
he takes the role of the natural philosopher to be the pursuit of true causes of phenomena. 
49  For accounts of  Descartes ’ maturation on the relation between  hypotheses and scientifi c episte-
mology, see Clarke  1989 , chapter 7, and  2011 and McMullin  1990 ,  2000 and  2008 . For a much 
earlier account of many of these themes recently developed by Clarke and McMullin, including a 
discussion of hypotheses, see Garber  1978 . 
50  Mariotte  1678 , 624. 
51  Du Châtelet  1740 , chapter 4. 
52  For discussions on why  Descartes ’  hypotheses are not merely speculative, see for example, 
McMullin  2008 , 89 and Clarke  1989 , 141–4. The latter makes a distinction between arbitrary and 
reasonable hypotheses, with reasonable hypotheses being assumptions, which can be systematized 
and unifi ed into a system, ideally bound by laws. 
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 In the clock example above, I suggest a crudely parallel approach. And presum-
ably the life scientist could employ the method of hypothesis posing and testing 
with respect to the purposes – the internal ends – that she fi nds in at least some liv-
ing bodies. To put this in the context of the three teleological issues: God could have 
conveyed purposes upon living bodies, not with respect to their ground-fl oor meta-
physical natures as matter-as-extension but with respect to their derivative natures 
 vis-a-vis the sort and structure of their matter (natures and  teleology ), and although 
we can never  know what those purposes are, we can develop beliefs about those 
purposes that are fairly likely true (epistemology and teleology), and we can do so 
through a method to which  Descartes is very friendly, namely the method of posit-
ing  hypotheses and seeing how they hold up to additional empirical data (method 
and teleology). That is, perhaps she could amass other example of hearts similar in 
structure to the human’s heart to see if the mitral valve operates similarly therein. Or 
perhaps she could posit an hypothesis to test for other ends served by the heart’s 
structure so as to determine whether or not that specifi c structure serves a number of 
other purposes benefi cial to keeping the whole organism healthy and alive. 
 The merely probable, and not certain, nature of the purposes of teleological fea-
tures in living bodies would not undermine  Descartes ’ separation of living beings 
within a broader class of self-moving machines. Recall the general approach I sug-
gested that Descartes takes to the study of living bodies. First, pre-theoretically, he 
identifi es the kinds of bodies that belong to the class of living bodies, and these are 
plants, animals and human bodies. Then, he theorizes (or one can theorize on his 
behalf) about members of this domain. This theorizing can isolate (as argued in sec-
tion I) a set of causes (heat and structure of a suitable nature) and a set of effects (a 
hierarchy of life behaviors), which are able to demarcate all and only these individu-
als. The job of the life scientist is to investigate these causes and effects, and in some 
cases (e.g. the mitral valves of the heart), features of the living being turn out to be 
explicable only by making appeal to a plan held by a conscious craftsman of those 
bodies, a plan that guided the construction of those bodies. The theoretical account 
of living beings turns out to be irreducibly teleological. Given Descartes’ strictures 
against claiming knowledge of God’s purposes with respect to the natural world, at 
best the natural philosopher could only hypothesize about God’s purposes with 
respect to his plans for living bodies. She may be wrong about those purposes, but 
being so does not mean that Descartes loses the category of life  tout court . It means 
simply that the natural philosopher will sometimes be mistaken in her explanations 
of some parts or processes that embody, in their very nature, internal ends – an 
embodiment that contributes to that which distinguishes the living from the non- 
living. Moreover, one can use Descartes’ own account of probability with respect to 
 hypotheses to argue that the larger number of effects that can be explained by the 
supposed purpose, the greater the probability that the natural philosopher has hit 
upon the true teleological explanation of the behavior under investigation. One can 
never reach certainty, but a hypothesis can be thought to be more probably true with 
more and more effects accounted for by the hypothesis. This is in keeping with 
Descartes’ participation in the historical emergence of a new scientifi c epistemol-
ogy (recognizable to us today), according to which the probable is a respectable 
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category and not to be discarded as merely speculative. So, far from posing a problem 
for Descartes by, for example, undermining the distinction between the living and 
the non-living, the role played by hypotheses regarding purposes is a scientifi cally 
powerful tool, which has the promise of spurring on empirical investigations of the 
behaviors of living things in order to grant greater and greater degrees of probability 
to the hypotheses posed. 
 Alas,  Descartes rejects this approach – while we can hypothesize about God’s 
purposes when engaged in moral philosophy, we cannot do so in natural philosophy 
(AT VII, 375; CSM II, 258). This is strongly implied by the nature of the hypotheti-
cal causes that Descartes specifi es in the  Principles – specifi c sizes, shapes and so 
forth of subvisible parts of matter (AT VIIIa, 325–6; CSM I, 288), and not God’s 
plan with respect to the construction of the built machine. So, from Descartes’ point 
of view, what I suggest above is illegitimate; we cannot use teleological explana-
tions in so far as they are grounded in claims about God’s purposes  even as merely 
likely true beliefs in our explanations about the natural world, and so we cannot 
explain the teleological nature of (at least some) life activities by relying upon hypo-
thetical claims to God’s purposes as embodied in (at least some) living bodies. This 
is the core of Descartes’ diffi culty as I see it in his conception of living bodies: he 
does not exploit his scientifi cally powerful tool of the method of  hypotheses in the 
realm of  teleology and the life sciences. For without extending his friendliness to 
hypotheses regarding micro-mechanisms in natural philosophy to hypotheses about 
the internal ends of living bodies – for this would ultimately require making claims 
about God’s likely purposes – it is impossible to make teleological claims about 
living bodies. But as I have shown in section II above, the theoretically robust con-
ception of living bodies that one can develop on Descartes’ behalf, and for which 
there is textual evidence in Descartes’ corpus,  depends upon making at least one 
teleological claim about living bodies. So some crucial aspects of what I take to be 
Descartes’ theoretically robust explanation of living bodies that can reliably pick 
out all and only plants, animals, and human bodies, run afoul of Descartes’ meta-
physics of God’s mind and what we can know of it. 
 Descartes does not reject hypothesizing about God’s purposes  tout court ; he 
explicitly allows that we can engage in such an endeavor in the fi eld of ethics by 
hypothesizes about God’s purposes for us as moral beings. He does not, as we have 
seen, extend this use of  hypotheses to the purposes of natural beings. To understand 
why, we should note that he offers two objections to using fi nal causes in natural 
philosophy. His fi rst objection is that it is hubris to suppose we know God’s pur-
poses; I have provided a way that Descartes could have side-stepped this worry 
given his friendliness to hypotheses. For in hypothesizing about God’s purposes, we 
do not claim to  know them. His second objection is that fi nal causal explanations are 
the wrong kinds of explanations to offer in natural philosophy (AT V, 158; CSMK 
341). 53 But these sorts of causal explanations can co-exist with Descartes’ favored 
form of explanation grounded in effi cient causes, and they can co-exist within a 
53  For discussion of  Descartes ’ reluctance to include fi nal causes in natural philosophy, see 
Simmons  2001 and Hatfi eld  2008 . 
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Cartesian ontology of matter. One can hypothesize about God’s likely purposes as 
he embodied them in living bodies, and these purposes can be compatible with a 
mechanical ontology of the material world, where all bodies are ultimately made up 
out of matter (as extension) in inertial lawful motion. One can further provide effi -
cient causal explanations for how God’s purposes are carried out in the living 
machines that he has built, as we witness over and over again in Descartes’ reduc-
tionist explanations of life phenomena. It is true that precluding fi nal causal expla-
nations  forces the natural philosopher to give effi cient causal explanations if she is 
to engage at all in explanation – that is, if she is to engage in that crucial aspect of 
natural philosophy. But allowing fi nal causal explanations does not thereby auto-
matically preclude her giving effi cient causal explanations as well. Descartes’ 
overly cautious approach to the hypothesizing about God’s purposes with respect to 
the natural world might have been sensible given the intellectual climate that forged 
him as a thinker, but it was unnecessary, and in going this route, he gave up on one 
crucially powerful tool for use within the sciences of life. 
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